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Abstract: Banks are special in that their liabilities are widely accepted as a means
of payment, thereby often needed by real sectors to obtain resources. This paper studies
this interaction between the banking sector and real sectors on competitive markets and
the policy response of the central bank to market ine¢ ciency, which is determined by
the aggregate wealth of banks. In the circumstance of a credit crunch, the central bank
improves e¢ ciency by allowing banks to borrow its at money at zero interest up to
a limit. This policy bears the avor of quantitative easing policies (QE). It produces
real e¤ects in the absence of surprises and nominal rigidity. The mechanism in which it
works depends on a di¤erence in nature between bank-created money and at money.
Furthermore, this policy, while expanding the money supply, induces deation under
the positive productivity shock. Lastly, this paper explains when interest rate policy
and capital adequacy regulation are among the optimal policies within a unied model.
Key words: money creation by banks, bankswealth, central banking, quantitative
easing policy, deation, interest rate policy, capital adequacy regulation
JEL codes: E5, E65, G21.
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The community cannot get rid of its currency supply... The "hot potato" analogy
truly applies. For bank-created money, however, there is an economic mechanism of
extinction as well as creation, contraction as well as expansion. James Tobin (1963).
1 Introduction
Commercial banks are special in that their liabilities, especially that in the form of
demand deposit, are widely accepted as a means of payment1, whereas rarely so are
the liabilities of non-bank rms or households. Due to this di¤erence, real sector rms
often need to borrow a banks liability (usually called money in everyday language) as a
means of paying for resources that they want. Banksdecisions on the price and quan-
tity of money in lending and the competition between them, therefore, have profound
impact on the economic activity of real sectors, which, inversely, a¤ects the decisions of
and competition between banks. Furthermore, often, the central banks policy produces
e¤ects by a¤ecting bankslending decisions and are based on its ability to create an al-
ternative means of payment, namely at money. While money creation by banks is well
known and widely introduced in macroeconomic textbooks, these interactions between
real sectors, the banking sector, and the central bank in relation to means of payment
have not been much studied yet,2 to understanding which this paper makes an attempt.
1Often lay people perceive that depositing cash is to let the bank store the money deposited. How-
ever, this perception is wrong. Depositing is an exchange, of cash to the banks liability, which is what
the depositor owns with the bank account and, when he makes a purchase with the account, is what
he uses for the payment.
2The interaction between the banking sector and real sectors is studied in the literature on nancial
intermediation, where money creation by banks is not concerned; see Gorton and Winton (2003) for
a survey. A strand of literature uses search-matching frameworks see e.g. Cavalcanti et. al. (1999)
and Williamson (1999) examines how and when certain privately issued claims circulate as a means
of payment, but has di¢ culty accommodating banksdecision on the price and scale of lending and
competition between them. Lastly, New Keynesian and the literature that uses frameworks of cash-
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Specically, it presents a general equilibrium analysis of money creation by banks and of
how certain policies of the central bank improve e¢ ciency over the market allocations.
This analysis results in new insights on the mechanism in which the quantitative easing
policy (QE) works, based on which this paper o¤ers an explanation for the observation
that the QE, while causing enormous monetary expansion, is associated with low ina-
tion or even deation pressure in certain economies. One of them is the Euro Area, as
is illustrated below:
Figure 1: The balance sheet of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Consumer Price
Index in the Euro Area over 01/01/2008-01/10/2017, with 01/01/2008 = 100. The three
hikes in the ECBs balance sheet during the period are associated with only slight price
increases, if anything at all. Source of the data: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
The model economy of the paper is populated by workers, entrepreneurs and banks.
Workers can produce the consumption good, corn, in autarky, or work for entrepre-
neurs. The specialty of banks is modeled with the assumption that workers accept
in-advance (CIA) both study monetary policy, but the former abstracts banks completely, while the
latter, when concerned with money creation by banks, lets the scale of banks lending pinned down
either by a binding reserve constraint (see e.g. Goodfriend and McCallum 2007), or by an exogenous
rule of holding excessive reserves (see e.g. Chen forthcoming and Mishkin 2016), which leaves little role
to banksown decisions .
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bankspromise to pay, but not entrepreneurs, as a means of wage payment. At date 0,
therefore, entrepreneurs rst borrow bankspromises to pay more specically, notes
that read like "X bank promises to pay the bearer 10 kilogram of corn tomorrow" 
and then use these notes to hire workers. As a result, entrepreneurs owe a debt to the
lender banks and banks to the workers. At date 1, entrepreneurs produce corn and use
it to settle their debts to the banks. Banks then use this repayment and their own corn,
which is stored over time and represents their wealth, to redeem their notes from the
workers by fullling the promises written on the notes.
In this economy, the real resources are workers labor and entrepreneurs capital,
and e¢ ciency is measured with the number of workers that entrepreneurs hire. Banks
matter, however, because entrepreneurs need to borrow their liabilities to hire workers.
How much banks lend in terms of real value determines how many workers entrepreneurs
hire and hence economic e¢ ciency. The aggregate lending of banks is in turn determined
by competition between them. What banks supply is a means of payment, which is a
homogenous good. They thus engage in Bertrand competition. Moreover, what a bank
lends is its liability. Hence the scale of its lending is anchored to its wealth by a borrowing
constraint.3 Put together, banks are engaged in Bertrand competition with a limited
capacity à la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). If the borrowing constraint is binding,
banksaggregate wealth determines the quantity of money supplied to entrepreneurs,
and hence e¢ ciency. If this wealth is below a threshold, the money supply is inadequate
and so is the number of workers that entrepreneurs hire.
This problem of meagre bank wealth depressing economic activity has been diagnosed
in many studies such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
However, these studies are not concerned with means of payment. Hence they do not
consider the possibility of a remedy with the central bank (CB) issuing at money. By
contrast, in this paper the CB can o¤er a remedy by allowing banks to borrow its at
3This borrowing constraint could be due to a moral hazard friction à la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
or Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), or due to the risk shifting problem à la Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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money at zero interest up to a bound. We show that although the economy lasts for
only two periods, in one equilibrium the at money circulates, owing through banks to
entrepreneurs, who thereby hire more workers. That is, the policy eases the constraints
imposed upon their economic activity by an inadequate supply of bank-created money.
Hence, the policy is called quantitative easing policy, or QE.
The QE enables banks to raise lending capacity without violating the borrowing
constraint, while backing by the same amount of wealth. It does so because at money
is di¤erent in nature to bank-created money. A central bank never commits to redeem
its at money at a specied value, whereas bank-created money is the banks liability,
which it commits to redeem at a pre-specied value and thus bears a real obligation
of repayment.4 To this di¤erence in nature that Tobin (1963) alludes above. As at
money is not redeemable, its value freely adjusts with the state of the economy. In
particular, its value falls in the event of the negative productivity shock, which means
ination. Ination reduces the real value of banksliability to the CB and thus slacks
their borrowing constraint giving them room to increase lending.5
While the QE induces ination in the event of the negative shock, it induces deation
in the event of the positive shock. This result might partly explain the aforementioned
observation that in some economies the QE causes a great monetary expansion on the
one hand and is companied with or followed by lingering low ination or even deation
pressure on the other hand, which is a puzzle if considered from the point of view of
4In the model economy, this fact is straightforward because banks use corn, the real good, to redeem
their liability. Even if they redeem it with at money, which is typically the case in the modern times,
they still need to spend real resources to obtain it. Hence bank-created money still bears real obligations
of repayment. For more discussion, see the remark on pages 28-9, Section 5.
5The point that monetary policy can help banks by a¤ecting the real value of their liabilities is also
considered by Diamond and Rajan (2006). Also, the way in which at money circulates in the model
economy is also in Allen and Gale (1998). However, these papers are not concerned with banks lending
their liabilities to real sectors to be used as means of payment, nor with the ine¢ ciency related to
bankswealth, nor with the quantitative easing policy.
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quantitative theory of money. A key di¤erence to it is that in this paper the money
created with the QE is utilized to expand real economic activity resulting in a rise in
the output of goods, which keeps the price down. Indeed, all the QE-created money is
utilized this way if the scale of the QE is below a threshold. If it is beyond it, the excess
is not put into circulation, we also nd. This nding partly explains another related
observation, that in some economies a substantial fraction of the monetary bases created
with the QE is not lent out but stays in banksreserve accounts.
This paper is in line with nascent literature that examines banksspecialty of their
liability being accepted as a means of payment. Most closely related is Donaldson,
Piacentino and Thakor (forthcoming). Both their paper and this one consider how
banksissuance of means of payment a¤ects the real economy as well as policy impli-
cations. The two papers, however, have di¤erent focuses. Their paper explains how
this specialty of banks is derived from their superior technology of warehousing, while
this paper emphasizes the importance of bankswealth for economic e¢ ciency. Also
the policy implications are di¤erent. Their paper shows that, contrary to the received
wisdom, a higher central-bank rate could raise bank lending, while this paper considers
the QE. Jakab and Kumhof (2015) describe in detail how banks create money with dou-
ble book-keeping. They focus on the quantitative implications of this facet of banking
in a full edged dynamic stochastic framework, but are not concerned with economic
e¢ ciency and policy responses, on which this paper focuses.
Since the recent crisis, many studies have examined the QE; see Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), among others. Their diagnosis on the source
of the problem is shared by this paper: bankswealth is too low causing inadequate
lending.6 However, those studies model banks not as issuers of means of payment, but
as intermediaries of trading real goods. As a result, in those studies what the government
issues must be backed by tax incomes and is essentially the sovereign debt, whereas what
6This is also true in a study by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013), where money plays the role of
a saving instrument, as in Samuelson (1958), rather than the role of means of payment.
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the central bank issues in this paper is purely nominal. Furthermore, the mechanism
in which the QE works is di¤erent. In those studies, it works by transferring wealth to
banks, whereas in this paper it works by reducing the real value of banksliability via
ination.
Other cases of ine¢ ciency in connection with private issuance of means of payment
are considered by Hart and Zingales (2015), Monnet and Sanches (forthcoming), and
Stein (2012). In Hart and Zingales (2015) and Stein (2012) ine¢ ciency is driven by
re sale externalities. In Monnet and Sanches (forthcoming) ine¢ ciency arises because
banks o¤er a return rate on the liability side that is lower than the inverse of time
discount. Besides this di¤erence in the source of ine¢ ciency, none of those studies
considers the circumstance of banks under-lending or the policy of QE, as this paper
does.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 analyses a benchmark case where banks face no borrowing constraint, thus subject
to unfettered forces of competition. This analysis not only examines the bank compe-
tition in the purest form, but also bears relevance to the historical banking. Section 4
introduces the borrowing constraint of banks. Section 5 studies the QE and Section 6
interest rate policy and capital-adequacy regulation. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to Appendix.
2 The Model
The economy has one storable good, corn, used as the numeraire, and lasts for two days.
Contracting and production occur at t = 0; yielding and consumption at t = 1. There
are N banks, N2 entrepreneurs and N3 workers, where N is a large number (later, in
section 5, the central bank will be introduced).7 Thus, banks are in perfect competition
7A setting with the same feature is to be found in Wang (2015), where continuum of [0; 1] and
[0; 1] [0; 1] instead of N and N2 is used. These two representations are equivalent.
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and each serves a large number of entrepreneurs; and there are more workers than
entrepreneurs can hire. All agents are risk-neutral and protected by limited liability.
Workers either produce w kilograms (kg) of corn in autarky, or are hired by entre-
preneurs, who each have h units of human or physical capital. If an entrepreneur hires
L workers at t = 0; then his project yields at t = 1
y = eAh1 L;
where 0 <  < 1: Without losing any generality, normalize h = 1: Productivity, eA; is
subject to a common shock. At t = 0; it is common knowledge that the good state
with eA = A occurs with probability q > 0 and the bad state with eA = A occurs with
probability 1  q > 0. Let Ae  qA+ (1  q)A denote the mean. Assume:
0 < A < Ae: (1)
As there are more workers than can be hired by entrepreneurs, in equilibrium workers
are indi¤erent in working for the latter or in autarky. Therefore they earn a real wage
of w. This wage is independent of economic activity of the other sectors, which gives a
convenience for exposition.
Banks each have G units of corn, where a unit is dened as N kg and used wherever
banks are concerned. Banks supply no real resources for corn production. What makes
banks relevant is due to the following assumption.
Assumption 1: Workers do not accept entrepreneurspromise to pay but banks
as a means of wage payment.
This assumption captures the specialty of banks explicated in the Introduction. Ac-
cording to Kiyotaki and Moore (2001), this di¤erence between banks and entrepreneurs
arises because the former has stronger commitment power than the latter.
Due to this assumption, entrepreneurs cannot hire workers at t = 0 with a promise to
pay them later at t = 1: To hire workers, enterpreneurs need to borrow bankspromise
to pay them at t = 1. We assume that banks have no di¢ culty enforcing repayment
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from entrepreneurs and hence this borrowing is feasible. To x the idea, suppose that
bankspromises to pay are printed on notes. That is, a note issued by a bank reads
that this bank promises to pay the bearer of this note with a certain quantity of corn
at t = 1:8 This quantity is the notes face value or par value.
Assumption 2: The face values of banksnotes cannot be contingent on the real-
ization of eA:
This assumption captures the observation that in real life a private security that
serves as a means of payment, such as demand deposit, promissory notes, cheques, or
trade credit, commonly bears xed claims and is of debt, and is rarely a contingent
claim.9
Besides the friction of payment, entrepreneurs lack commitment power in another
dimension.
Assumption 3: entrepreneurs are unable to make commitment on the scale of their
projects in terms of the number of workers they will hire.
This friction is real in the sense that it is unrelated to means of payment. In the
absence of the friction, a bank would be willing to lower the interest rate, denoted
by r; to a borrower entrepreneur who commits to a smaller scale, because thereby his
project delivers a higher average return rate. This, however, would give entrepreneurs
an incentive to borrow from multiples banks, each in a small amount and thus at a
favorable rate. The presence of the real friction, therefore, is justied if entrepreneurs
cannot be prevented from doing so. The importance of its presence is that it engenders
a wedge between the rst- and second-best allocations, as will be shown.
8In the model economy banks promise to pay the real good in redeeming their liability, whereas
in modern times, they typically redeem it with at money, the central banks issues. Other instances
of claims on real goods used as a means of payment incude Hart and Zingales (2015) and Williamson
(1999). This abstraction is harmless in the baseline model where ination is not concerned with. Where
it is, as in Section 5 below, the abstraction helps clarify the mechanism in which the QE works.
9For why that is the case, see Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom
(2012).
10
Due to the friction, a bank posts a single interest rate r for loans of any size E rather
than a menu of r (E). A loan contract is represented by a prole of (E; r): at t = 0, the
entrepreneur borrows the banks notes of overall face value E and at t = 1 he is obliged
to pay E(1 + r) kg corn back to the bank.
The timing of events is as follows.
At t = 0; each bank posts the aggregate face value of notes that it will issue, D; and
the interest rate that it will charge, r: Observing all these o¤ers, each entrepreneur then
chooses one bank to go to and asks to borrow face E of the banks notes. If one banks
notes are over-demanded, only a fraction of the entrepreneurs have their demand met.
Entrepreneurs then use borrowed notes to hire workers and start the production. Banks
store their G units of corn.
At t = 1; entrepreneurs produce corn. They either repay E(1 + r) kg corn to the
lender banks or default. In that case they give all their output of corn to the banks.
After receiving repayments from the entrepreneurs, the sum total denoted by eY ; banks
redeem notes from workers. If eY +G  D to a bank, its notes are redeemed at par. IfeY + G < D; the bank defaults and the notes are redeemed at fraction eY +G =D of
their par values. Finally, the agents consume the corn in their possession.
In anticipation of the possibility of default, at t = 0 a banks notes are discounted
with factor of
 = E eA[min(1; eY +GD )]: (2)
Passing on to the equilibrium analysis, we gure out two benchmark allocations.
The First-Best and Second-Best Allocations
E¢ ciency concerns the number of workers allocated to entrepreneurs. Dene the
rst-best allocation as the number of workers that maximizes the social surplus of
projects, which is AeL   wL due to universal risk neutrality and the opportunity
cost of labor being w: The rst-best allocation is thus
LFB = (
Ae
w
)
1
1  :
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The second-best allocation is dened as the number of workers that entrepreneurs
would hire in the competitive equilibrium if the friction of payment (in Assumption 1)
were absent, but the real friction (in Assumption 3) remained. That is, if entrepreneurs
could hire workers with their own promise to pay, but their wage o¤er could not be
conditional on the scale of their projects. The equilibrium allocation is as follows.
Lemma 1 The second-best number of workers that entrepreneurs hire is:
LSB = (
qA+ (1  q)A
w
)
1
1  :
Obviously, LSB > LFB. That is, the real friction induces the entrepreneurs to hire
too many workers.10 This fact engenders a circumstance of banks over-lending, among
remedies to which are interest rate policy and capital adequacy regulation, as will be
shown in sections 4 and 6.
Below we rst analyze the baseline model in which bank issuance is subject to no
borrowing constraints, nor any other restrictions. This analysis serves two purposes.
One, it studies the competitive equilibrium of money creation by banks in the purest
form. The other, the analysis bears relevance to early periods of the banking history.
3 The Least Fettered Issuance
In the least fettered issuance, banks can nance an unlimited quantity of assets by
issuing promises to pay. The equilibrium quantity is of course limited, as examined
below. We rst consider the demand side of the market for banks notes, then the
supply side, and, nally, the meeting of the two.
10For a more general analysis of this type of ine¢ ciency see Wang (2010).
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3.1 The Demand Side of the Market for Notes
Consider a representative entrepreneur who borrows from a bank o¤ering (D; r): If he
borrows notes of a face value E, then they are worth E; where the discount factor ; as
will be shown, is a function of (D; r). With these notes, he hires workers in a number of
L =
E
w
; (3)
because they earn real wage w: At t = 1; the entrepreneur either repays E(1+r) of corn
to the bank or defaults. Thus, his decision problem is:
max
E
E eA[max( eAL   E(1 + r); 0)]; s:t:(3):
Lemma 2 For any (w; ; r), the solution to the above problem satises AL < E(1+r).
That is, entrepreneurs all default in the bad state.
This lemma is driven by the assumption that A < Ae; which says that the negative
shock is severe enough to knock entrepreneurs into default.
At the optimum, the demand of the representative entrepreneur for the notes is
E(; r) = (
A
1 + r
)
1
1  (

w
)

1  (4)
and the number of workers that he hires and his prot are, respectively,
L(R) = (
A
wR
)
1
1  (5)
V (R) = q(1  )(A
1

wR
)

1  ; (6)
where
R  1 + r

: (7)
Note that so dened R is the actual interest rate and measures the cost of borrowing:
To obtain a means of payment that is worth 1, the entrepreneur borrows notes of face
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value 1=; then in a debt of (1+ r)=: Naturally, his scale of hiring and his prot, which
are both real variables, are inversely related to the cost of borrowing, namely, R:
Recall that the e¢ ciency concerns only the number of the workers hired by entre-
preneurs, which depends only on the actual interest rate. The e¢ ciency of market
equilibrium is thus determined solely by the actual interest rate in equilibrium. De-
ne RFB (RSB) be the value of the actual interest rate at which entrepreneurs hire the
rst-best (second-best) number of workers, that is, L(R) = LFB (LSB): With (5),
RFB =
A
Ae
RSB =
A
qA+ (1  q)A:
After banks all have posted (D; r), each entrepreneur decides which bank to go to.
In the equilibria of this subgame, an entrepreneur gets the same expected prot, bV , from
any bank who attracts a number of entrepreneurs.11 As entrepreneursprot depends
only on the actual interest rate, dene bR by V ( bR) = bV : Then, bR is the actual interest
rate that prevails on the notes market, conditional on bankschoices of (D; r): Given
that there is a large number of banks, any single bank is too small to a¤ect bR with its
choice of (D; r) and takes it as given when making that choice.
3.2 The Supply Side of the Market for Notes
Consider a representative bank. To attract entrepreneurs to come, the bankchoice of
(D; r) satises V (R)  bV or, equivalently, (1 + r)=  bR: While the interest rate r is
directly chosen by the bank, the discount factor of its notes  is determined by (D; r).
It depends on whether the bank ever defaults or not, that is, whether D > eY + G in
11By o¤ering (D; r); which determines ; each bank chooses an actual interest rate R = (1+ r)=: No
entrepreneur goes to a bank o¤ering V (R) < bV when he can get bV elsewhere. On the other hand, if a
bank o¤ers V (R) > bV , it induces over-demand for its notes (which is never optimal), so an entrepreneur
coming to it is served with such a probability l that l  V (R) = bV .
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some state at t = 1: In the good state, eY = Y = D(1 + r) because the entrepreneurs do
not default. As a result, the bank does not default. In the bad state, by Lemma 2, all
the entrepreneurs default and pass the output of their projects on to the bank, of which
the aggregate value is given below:
Lemma 3 The aggregate value of the banks loans in the bad state is
Y =
A
A
D(1 + r):12 (8)
In the bad state, the bank does not default if and only if D  G+Y ; which, with Y
given by (8), is equivalent to
D  (1  A(1 + r)
A
)  G: (9)
On the left hand side is the loss made by lending in the bad state, D   Y : Thus, the
inequality says that banks will stay solvent in the bad state if and only if their lending
scale, D, is not too large relative to their wealth, G, so that the loss from loans can be
absorbed by the wealth.
Substitute the value of eY given above into (2), and the discount factor of the banks
notes is determined by its choice of (D; r) via:
(D; r) =
8<: 1, if (9) is satisedq  1 + (1  q) (G
D
+ A(1+r)
A
), otherwise
9=; : (10)
Now consider the representative banks decision problem at t = 0: Taking into ac-
count the possibility of default, its economic prot with the choice of (D; r), denoted by
(D; r), is EeY max(G+ eY  D; 0) G:
Lemma 4
(D; r) = D

1 + r
RSB
  

: (11)
12Y < Y because A < Ae by assumption and Ae < A:
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Therefore, the prot margin of lending, that is, the prot of lending out a note of
face value 1, is (1 + r) =RSB  : Intuitively, the present value of this note, which is part
of the banks liability, is ; while the banks revenue from such lending is EeY
eY =D =
(1 + r) =RSB:
The representative bank chooses (D; r) to maximize (D; r) subject to the constraint
that it can attract entrepreneurs to come, that is,
1 + r
(D; r)
 bR: (12)
Given the scale of lendingD, the bank wants to charge an interest rate as high as possible
so long as it can attract entrepreneurs. Therefore, at the optimum, the constraint (12)
is binding.13 Hence, the banks optimal choice of r as a function of its choice of D;
denoted by r(D); is determined by
1 + r
(D; r)
= bR;
and banksproblem becomes
max
D
D(D; r(D))
" bR
RSB
  1
#
:
As  > q always (because the bank always redeems its notes at par in the good
state), the following proposition is self-evident.
Proposition 1 The solution to and the value of the representative banks problem are:
(i) if bR > RSB; then D =1 and  =1;
(ii) if bR = RSB; then  = 0; and the bank is indi¤erent to any value of D, with
r = r(D);
(iii) if bR < RSB; then lending makes a loss, and thus D = 0 and  = 0:
As was shown, the prot margin of lending equals 
 bR=RSB   1 and is positive if
and only if bR > RSB: Moreover, if the prot margin of lending is positive, banks obtain
13Mathematically, given D; both 1+r
RSB
  (D; r) and 1+r(D;r) increases with r.
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 =1: That is because, despite their limited stocks of corn, they all have an unlimited
lending capacity (i.e. D = 1); due to two reasons. One, what banks lend out is their
promise to pay, essentially word of mouth, which they can innitely supply. The other,
banks are subject to no constraints on the quantity of supply in the baseline model.
3.3 The Equilibrium: The Second-Best Allocation Attained
The prevailing actual interest rate, bR; which plays the role of price, clears the market
for notes in equilibrium. We dene the symmetric equilibrium below and discuss other
equilibria later.
Denition 1 A prole (fD; r; ; Eg; bR) forms an equilibrium if:
(i) given bR; bankschoice of (D; r) is optimal and thus given in Proposition 1. This
choice determines  = (D; r) through (10);
(ii) given that all banks o¤er the same (D; r; ) ; entrepreneurs go to each bank with
the same probability and by the Law of Large Numbers, each bank receive N of them.
Their demand for notes, E; is optimal, that is, E = E(; r) given by (4);
(iii) the market clears: D = E:14
In any equilibrium, banks neither obtain an innitely large prot, nor abstain from
lending, which, by Proposition 1, is the case if and only if
bR = RSB:
Therefore, the real allocation in equilibrium is unique and conforms with the second-
best allocation, the one that would arise if the friction of payment were absent and
entrepreneurs could hire workers with their own promises to pay. Intuitively, what
banks supply is a mean of payment, a homogeneous good. Furthermore, in this case of
unfettered issuance, they all have unlimited capacity. Therefore, they are in Bertrand
14Note that D is in the unit of N kg, while entrepreneursdemand is denoted with the unit of kg.
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competition, which annihilates their prot margin. As a result, entrepreneurs overcome
the friction of payment at no costs and the real allocation is the one that would arise if
the friction were absent, that is the second best allocation.
On the nominal side, however, there is indeterminacy. At bR = RSB; by Proposition 1,
the prot margin of lending is 0, and individual banks are indi¤erent to any quantity of
issues, although in aggregation, their issues exactly su¢ ce for entrepreneurs to hire LSB
workers. This indeterminacy leads to a continuum of equilibria besides the symmetric
one dened above. In the symmetric equilibrium, all banks issue the same quantity
of notes and their notes are discounted at the same factor, therefore, one banks notes
are perfect substitutes for anothers. In asymmetric equilibria, however, some banks
issue more than others despite ex ante being identical, and see their notes more heavily
discounted.
Proposition 2 (i) In any equilibrium, independent of bankswealth G, bR = RSB; the
prot margin of bank lending is 0, and the second-best allocation is attained.
(ii) In any equilibrium, a fraction of banks default at t = 1 upon the realization ofeA = A if and only if bankswealth is below a threshold G; where
G = [(qA+ (1  q)A)  A](qA+ (1  q)A
w
)

1  :
An intuition for result (i) is given above. As for (ii), note that given banks are
indi¤erent to any quantity of issues, the quantity of money circulated, that is, the
aggregate bank lending, is determined by the demand side, namely entrepreneurs. Thus,
the aggregate bank issues are xed at a quantity exactly su¢ cient for entrepreneurs to
hire the second-best number of workers. With this scale of lending, if bankswealth, G,
is su¢ ciently low namely G < G then it is insu¢ cient to absorb the loss incurred
in the bad state and bank default occurs accordingly.
The baseline mode examined above, besides providing a simple framework to consider
money creation by banks on competitive markets, also bears empirical relevance to the
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early periods of the banking history during which a large number of banks issue their
own notes and discount others, such as the Free Banking Era in the U.S. (1838-1863)
and a period between 1750-1844 in England.15 Specically, the baseline model derives
relationship between the loan interest rate r, the discount factor , the leverage ratio
 := D=G; and the risks of default 1  q of individual banks. First, 1+r

= bR; a constant
across banks, by the binding constraint (12). Therefore, the paper predicts that across
banks, the gross interest rate that a bank charges for loans (i.e. 1+r) is positively related
to and solely determined by the discount factor of its notes , independent of the banks
other attributes. Second, regarding the discount factor, from (10) and binding (12) it
follows that
 =
8<: 1 if   (1 
A
A
bR) 1
q+(1 q) 1
1 (1 q) A
A
bR if   (1  AA bR) 1
9=; : (13)
Therefore, the discount factor of a banks notes  is inversely related to the banks default
risk 1  q16 and its leverage  (which is endogenous). The rst part of this prediction
is empirically conrmed by Gorton (1999) who studies the pricing of banknotes during
the U.S. Free Banking Era.17
The applicability of the baseline model to the modern banking is more limited. A
fundamental assumption of the model, namely that banks face no constraints in making
loans, is probably far from reality nowadays. In particular, due to this assumption, the
15For the case of the U.S., according to Gorton (1999), thousands of di¤erent banksnotes were in
circulation, while for the case of the England, Cameron et. al. (1967) report that in year 1810 there
were 783 note issuing county banks in England.
16In the lower branch of (13) @=@q share the sign of 1   A
A
bR    1; which is positive because in
that branch   (1  A
A
bR) 1; that is,  1  1  A
A
bR:
17Specically, he found that possessing traits of low default risks, such as being a member of the
Su¤olk System or under a state sponsored insurance, is negatively correlated with the implied volatility
of the bank, of which the discount factor or price in his paper is a decreasing function. Therefore,
the low-risk traits are associated with a higher value of .
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baseline model predicts that the aggregate quantity of bank credit is independent of
bankswealth, G; whereas the aftermath of the recent nancial crisis witnesses that the
banking sector reduces credit issuance after su¤ering a severe loss. To give an account
for this observation in particular and to examine the modern banking in general, we
shall introduce a borrowing constraint to banks, as below.
4 BanksWealth Matters in the Presence of a Bor-
rowing Constraint
In this section, we assume banks are subject to a borrowing constraint, that their equity
value should never fall below (1   )G:18 The equity value is higher in the good state
than it is in the bad state. Thus, we only need to consider the constraint in the bad
state, which is G + Y   D  (1   )G: With Y = A(1 + r)=(A)  D by (8) and
rearrangement, it becomes:
D 

1  A(1 + r)
A

 G: (14)
The introduction of the constraint has two immediate implications. One, as banks
always maintain a positive equity value, they never default. Therefore, their notes are
not discounted, that is,  = 1 and hence 1+ r = bR hereafter. As a result, the borrowing
constraint (14) becomes
D 

1  A
A
bR  G: (15)
18This borrowing constraint can be due to several reasons. One, in the modern times bank default
becomes very costly and banksmanagers want to maintain solvency in any contingency, which is a
special case of the above constraint with  = 1: Another, as is in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and
Getler and Kiyotaki (2010), banks have a moral hazard issue: at t = 1; the owner of a bank  the
banker can abscond with a fraction of 1    of its stored wealth to a remote island. Hence, banks
equity value should never fall below (1  )G in any contingency.
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The other, unlike in the preceding case of least fettered issuance, banks now are in
Bertrand competition with limited capacities à la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). With
the borrowing constraint, the market equilibrium is as follows.
Proposition 3 (i) If G  1

G; then in all equilibria the real allocation is the same as
in the case of least fettered issuance: bR = RSB; the prot margin of bank lending is 0,
and L = LSB:
If G < 1

G; there is a unique equilibrium in which the prot margin of bank lending
is positive; and bR > RSB and bR is determined by G through
G =
1

(
A
w
)
1
1 
1  A
A
bRbR 11   G( bR): (16)
(ii) If G decreases from 1

G to 0 the equilibrium interest rate, bR; increases from
RSB to A=A and the number of workers hired by entrepreneurs decreases from LSB to
LSB  [ A
qA+(1 q)A ]
1
1  :
The borrowing constraint limits bankscapacity of issuance to an endogenous pro-
portion of their wealth. If their wealth is high enough that is, beyond 1

G then
banks still possess a capacity large enough to annihilate the prot margin of issuance,
which leads to the second-best allocation, as was in the case of least fettered issuance.
Hence arises result (i).
If G < 1

G; bankswealth does not su¢ ce to back an issuance of that size. As a
result, issuance bears a positive prot margin. This positive prot margin drives all
banks to issue as much as possible, until the borrowing constraint, (15), is binding.
This clears the indeterminacy in the quantity of individual banksissues and gives rise
to a unique equilibrium. It also shows that, now, the quantity of money circulated
is determined by the supply side namely, the banking sector  rather than by the
demand side, as was in the case of least fettered issuance. Therefore, the lower the
bankswealth, the lower the total value of money that they supply and, as a result, the
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higher the interest rate of borrowing ( bR) and the fewer the workers that entrepreneurs
hire.
The last comparative static, however, does not mean the aggregate output always
decreases with G for G < 1

G because of the wedge between the rst-best and second-
best allocations, namely LFB < LSB. Dene
GFB  G(RFB);
where function G( bR) is dened in equation (16); with RFB = A=Ae,
GFB =
1

(Ae  A)(Ae=w) 1  :
Then GFB is the level of bankswealth at which the actual interest rate exactly takes
the rst-best value and therefore the aggregate output is maximized. GFB < 1

G.19 By
Proposition 3, then, there are two types of e¢ ciency.
(1) G < GFB: In this case, bR > RFB and L < LFB: That is, relative to the rst-best
allocation, banks under-lend, whereby the cost of bank credit is too high and the sector
that depends on it namely entrepreneurs obtains inadequate resources, namely labor.
(2) G > GFB: In this case, bR < RFB and L > LFB: That is, relative to the rst-best
allocation, banks over-lend, whereby the cost of bank credit is too low and the sector
that depends on it obtains excessive resources.
The existence of the second type of ine¢ ciency is due to Assumption 3, which drives
a wedge between the rst-best and second-best allocations. In the absence of this wedge,
RFB would be equal to RSB; hence G(RFB) to 1

G; and the case of bank over-lending
would not exist. This case of over-lending provides the paper with room to accommodate
interest-rate policy and capital adequacy regulation, as will be shown in Section 6.
The rst type of ine¢ ciency is caused by inadequate creation of money by banks.
Can the central bank enlarge the money supply through the banking system? It can,
we show in the next section, with a policy which, as it eases the constraints imposed by
dearth of money, is called the Quantitative Easing Policy, or QE.
19That is because RFB > RSB , 1G
 = G(RSB) and function G(R) is decreasing.
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5 The QE Slacks the Borrowing Constraint of Banks
The central bank (CB hereafter) in this economy is modeled as the unique entity that
is able to costlessly produce another means of payment which has no intrinsic values; to
x the idea, let it be shells. Shells are di¤erent in nature to bank notes. The CB does
not promise to pay a holder of shells with any corn, the real good. Shells, therefore, are
purely nominal. By contrast, a bank commits to redeem its notes with the promised
amounts of corn. Hence banksnotes are not nominal.
Although shells are at money and the model economy lasts for only two dates, shells
can circulate in it, whereby the CB can conduct meaningful monetary policy, such as
the following QE. At t = 0 the CB announces a facility whereby each of the N banks
can borrow up to S units of shells (again 1 unit dened as N kg) at a small interest
rate  > 0: A borrower bank is obliged to repay its debt to the CB at t = 1 either with
shells or with corn, with a xed rate of exchanging corn for shells, for example, 1kg corn
for 1kg shells. This exchange rate is arbitrary and is made to confer a nominal value
on shells, as in real life Bank of England can print an arbitrary number, like £ 10, on
a piece of paper, and then this piece of paper has a nominal value of £ 10 and can be
used to buy real goods of this value (e.g. two packs of cherries at M&S). As such, we
call 1kg corn as the par value of 1kg shells etc., although shells are nominal. The banks
that have used the CBs facility thus have two types of money to lend to entrepreneurs.
One is their own notes, the other shells. We assume that no entrepreneurs borrow both
types of money in order to avoid the unnecessary complication of which debt of the two
is senior in case of default.
The contract of borrowing a banks notes is still represented by (E; r), whereby the
entrepreneur borrows the banknotes of face value E at t = 0 and then owes it a debt
of E(1 + r), which he repays at t = 1 with corn.
The contract of borrowing shells is similarly represented by (Es; rs) whereby the
entrepreneur borrows Es kg shells at t = 0 and then owes the bank a debt of Es(1+ rs),
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which he repays at t = 1 with either corn or shells, with 1kg corn equivalent to 1kg
shells.
The timing of events at t = 0 is as follows. First, the CB chooses S and publicly
announces the policy. Then, banks decide the quantity of shells to borrow from the CB,
Q  S; and post o¤ers of (D; r;Q; rs): Based on these o¤ers, entrepreneurs decide which
bank to go to and how much they borrow. Lastly, they use borrowed means of payment
(bank notes or shells) to hire workers and start the production.
The timing of events at t = 1 is as follows. First, entrepreneurs produce corn.
Second, the market for shells opens, on which the shell-borrowing entrepreneurs use
corn to buy shells from workers. Let p1 (p1) denote the shell price in the good (bad)
state. Third, entrepreneurs settle their debts to the lender banks, using corn and/or
shells. Fourth, the market for shells may open the second time, on which banks having
excessive shells sell to banks in shortage. Lastly, banks redeem their notes from workers
and settle their debts to the CB. At this stage, the CB may end up with holding a
certain quantity of corn, which it will transfer to the agents of the economy before the
consumption starts.
Note that there is no surprise or nominal rigidity associated with the QE. All the
private sector agents (i.e. banks, entrepreneurs and workers) made decisions after having
observed the CBs move and they can freely adjust their decisions with it. Still, the QE
produces real e¤ects in this economy in one equilibrium if G < 1

G.20 For anyG < GFB;
moreover, there exists a unique value of S at which this equilibrium attains the rst best
allocation. This is the equilibrium that we discuss below.
20As shells are at money, there is another equilibrium in which workers disbelieve that shells will
have real value at t = 1 and thus do not accept to be paid with shells at t = 0; which are thus not
circulated. This type of equilibria exists for at money in general. By contrast, they never exist for
banksnotes: banks each have G units of corn, therefore their notes always have a positive real value
at t = 1; indeed, if a bank issues D  G; workers know, without any equilibrium calculation, that its
notes are worth at par. This di¤erence results from the di¤erence in nature between shells and banks
notes stated at the beginning of this section.
24
In this equilibrium, at t = 0, workers believe that they will be able to use shells
to buy corn at t = 1 and thus they accept a wage payment with shells; and at t = 1,
indeed shells receive a positive real value, intuitively because they can be used to settle
certain debts that otherwise have to be settled with corn. To solve the equilibrium, we
rst examine what happens at t = 1 and then that at t = 0: Consider, rst, the case
in which S is below a threshold (which is given in Proposition 4 below) and therefore
rs >  in equilibrium. In this case, all the banks borrow to the full capacity of the QE,
namely, Q = S; and lend all the shells out to entrepreneurs. Therefore, at the beginning
of t = 1; there are NS units of shells in workershands and the aggregate debt of the
shell-borrowing entrepreneurs is NS  (1 + rs) units.
In the good state, as no entrepreneurs default, the shell price p1 = 1. On the one
hand, shells can never be worth more than their nominal values: if the entrepreneurs
use 1kg corn only to buy less than 1kg shells, they will not buy them, but use 1kg corn
to settle a debt of 1kg shells to the banks. On the other hand, in the good state, it
cannot be that p1 < 1 either. Otherwise, the shell-borrowing entrepreneurs would want
only shells, not corn, to repay all their debts. Their aggregate demand for shells would
thus be NS(1 + rs); as they do not default. This demand, with rs > 0; is bigger than
NS; the supply of shells, leaving the market uncleared.
As p1 = 1, the entrepreneurs are indi¤erent to repaying their banks with shells or
with corn in the good state. As a result, some banks may end up with more than S(1+)
units of shells, some less. If so, the former wants to sell the excess to the latter and
the second shell market opens. On this market, the equilibrium shell price, pB; equals 1
also, following the same argument as above. On the one hand, it impossible that pB > 1:
On the other hand, if pB < 1; banks all want to use only shells, not corn, to settle their
debts to the CB, and their aggregate demand would be NS(1+); greater than the total
supply, NS; thus the market uncleared. This argument holds true, and hence pB = 1 is
the only market clearing price, so long as  > 0; however small. To simplify exposition,
25
in what follows, we consider the limit case where ! 0.21
In the bad state, the output is low. Hence p1 < 1; as will be veried later. Thus, the
shell borrowing entrepreneurs use only shells, no corn, to repay the banks. Furthermore,
in this state entrepreneurs all default according to Lemma 2. This means all their
outputs are used to settle their debts to the banks. These two facts put together, all
the shell-borrowing entrepreneursoutput is used to buy shells. Denote by Ys the total
output of one banks shell-borrowing entrepreneurs. Then the shell market clearing
commands that p1 NS = NYs; or
p1 = Ys=S: (17)
With a calculation similar to that leading to equation (8), we nd p1 = A(1+ rs)=(A);
which, as is shown below in Proposition 4, is smaller than 1 indeed, as was intuitively
argued. Moreover, from p1 = Ys=S it follows that the shell-borrowing entrepreneurs of
one bank altogether buy Ys=p1 = S units of shells. Hence, each bank ends up with
having S units of shell equally and the second shell market does not open in the bad
state.
The value of 1 kg shells at t = 0; p0; is the mean of their values at t = 1:
p0 = q  1 + (1  q) A(1 + rs)
A
: (18)
Workers thus accept a wage payment with w=p0 kg shells at t = 0 in the equilibrium.
The e¤ect of this policy is presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose G < 1

G. (i) If the QEs scale S < S(G)  A
q(A A)(
1

G G),
then there is a unique equilibrium in which all the S units of shells are in circulation. In
21Note, however, that if  = 0; then there is indeterminancy: any price pB 2 [0; 1] can clear this
second shell market. If  = 0; the aggregate excess exactly equals the aggregate shortage. Then, the
supply side is willing to sell all the excessive shells at any pB  0, while the demand side is willing to
buy exactly the same amount at any pB  1.
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this equilibrium, the QE produces real e¤ects: the actual interest rate, bR; is determined
by S through
S = (
A
w
)
1
1   1  (1  q)
q

1

1
1 
  G
1  

 F (;G);with   A
A
bR: (19)
Moreover, the interest rate of lending shells is rs =
[qA+(1 q)A] bR A
A (1 q)A bR : It satises rs > 0
and A(1 + rs)=(A) < 1; as was said.
(ii) If S increases, bR and rs decrease and L increases. At S = S(G); bR = RSB;
rs = 0 and L = LSB:
The QE works by increasing the real value of money that banks lend out at t = 0:
That explains why, compared to the situation of its absence (namely with S = 0); the
cost of borrowing money ( bR) is reduced, whereby entrepreneurs hire more workers. And
the larger the scale of the QE (i.e. S), the greater are these e¤ects (so long as S is below
S(G)).
The question is: how is the QE able to make banks enlarge lending scale, backing
by the same amount of wealth without breaking the borrowing constraint? To answer
this question, consider a representative banks balance sheet at t = 1; as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Corn stored (G) Equity
Loans in notes (Y ) Liability to the note holders (D)
Loans in shells (Ys) Liability to the CB (p1S)
Table 1: The balance sheet (in real value) of the representative bank with the QE
Consider the bad state, in which the borrowing constraint is binding. The constraint
commands that G + Y + Ys   D   p1S  (1   )G: This inequality, with p1 = Ys=S
by (17), is equivalent to G + Y   D  (1   )G; which leads to inequality (14), the
same borrowing constraint in the absence of the QE. Therefore, the injection of the at
money with the QE does not reduce the capacity of private issuance at all. This is due to
27
p1 = Ys=S < p0
22; which means that in the bad state the shell price goes down, so that
the real value of a banks liability to the CB, p1S; falls enough to be covered by the value
of the assets, Ys: The decrease in the real value of shells means ination. Put di¤erently,
the QE enables banks to lend more without breaking the borrowing constraint because
it induces ination in the bad state, which lowers the real value of banksliability to
the CB. The ination arises because shells are at money. The CB never commits to
redeem shells with a real good. Their value, therefore, freely adjusts with the state of
the economy. By contrast, banks commit to redeem their notes (i.e. their promise to
pay) at a pre-specied, noncontingent, value.23 This di¤erence in nature between banks
notes and shells, therefore, drives the functioning of the QE.
Remark: An abstraction of the model helps elucidate this mechanism of the QE.
That is the denomination of banksliabilities with corn, the real good. In reality, how-
ever, typically they are denominated with the at money currency of the economy.
Incorporating this feature would not necessarily invalidate the working of the mecha-
nism. First, the aforementioned di¤erence in nature between bank created money and
currency is still there. Although banks now use the currency to redeem their liability,
to obtain the currency, they need to expend real resources. Therefore, their liability
still bears real obligations of repayment. In contrast, at money is not redeemable and
bears no such obligations. Second, it is true that if banksliability is denominated with
the currency, its real value falls under the negative shocks, which improves bankscon-
ditions. However, credit crunch still happens. So long as they face a binding borrowing
22p1 < p0 , p1 < q  1 + (1  q) p1 , p1 < 1; which holds true by the proposition.
23In the model economy, the value of these issues at t = 1 could be made contingent on the state in
two ways. One is to let the specied value contingent on the state, which is disallowed by Assumption
2. The other is default, which is disallowed because of the borrowing constraint, (14). While default
is disallowed altogether because of the particular form that the constraint takes, in general so long as
any borrowing constraint restricts bankscapacity, there is only a limited extent to which the value of
their liabilities can adjust to the real economic conditions.
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constraint, they will still reduce lending if their wealth is profusely eaten o¤, as is ev-
ident in the aftermath of the 2008-9 crisis. Third, in this circumstance, if the QE is
able to raise bankslending capacities, it has to slacken their borrowing constraint. As
it does not give real resources to banks, to do so it has to further reduce the real value
of banksliability and this can only be done via ination. Fourth, this reduction can
be done by the CB with the QE, but not by banks themselves, exactly because of the
above said di¤erence in nature between the two types of money.
At core is the point that this di¤erence gives the CB a leeway to act that banks do
not have. This point can be seen even more clearly in a modied version of the setting
where the CB implements the QE by directly lending shells to entrepreneurs (rather
than through banks) at interest rate rs, which would result in the same prices of shell
and the same allocation as in the original setting. Obviously in this setting the CB can
lend out the currency, whereas banks cannot lend more of their liabilities, because shells
are not redeemable but banksliabilities are. Moreover, if banksliabilities were now
denominated with the currency, this policy would still work. Actually it would work
better because it would slack banksborrowing constraint by inducing ination, which
enables them to enlarge the lending capacity.
Back to the model, while the QE induces ination in the bad state, it causes deation
in the good state: p1 = 1 > p0: This result might partly explain the lingering deation
pressure or the low ination observed during or after the implementation of the QE in
several economies, such as the U.K. and the Euro zone. This phenomenon would be a
puzzle if considered from the point of view of the quantitative theory of money, given
that the QE enormously expands the monetary base.
Thus far we have considered the case in which S < S(G) and therefore rs > 0: Now
we consider what happens if the QE is in a bigger scale. At S = S(G); bR = RSB and
rs = 0: By Proposition 1 (iii), bR can never fall below RSB, otherwise banks would stop
lending altogether, not a case in equilibrium. Therefore, if the scale of the QE is larger
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than S(G); then bR stays at RSB; rs at 0, and the excessive shells beyond the threshold
are not put into circulation; indeed, with rs = 0; banks are indi¤erent with any quantity
of shells to borrow and lend. This result partly o¤ers an explanation for the phenomenon
that in certain economies such as the U.S. and the Euro Zone, a substantial fraction of
monetary bases created with the QE is not lent out but stays in banksreserve accounts.
Now consider the optimal scale of the QE. The rst best value of the interest rate
is bR = RFB. In the circumstance where G  GFB and hence bR  RFB at S = 0,
any S > 0 only makes bR still smaller and e¢ ciency even lower. Therefore, the optimal
S = 0, namely, the CB should not implement the QE at all in the circumstance of banks
over-lending. However, in the the circumstance where G < GFB and hence bR > RFB
at S = 0; there is a unique value of S at which the QE drags down bR to RFB: This is
summarized below.
Proposition 5 (i) If G  GFB; the optimal scale of the QE is S = 0; that is, no QE
should be implemented.
(ii) If G < GFB; the optimal S = F ( A
A
 RFB;G) > 0, where function F () is given
by (19). At this scale the QE attains the rst-best allocation (i.e. bR = RFB): Moreover,
with the optimal QE, banks earn prot from lending shells (i.e. rs > 0); but their overall
prot is reduced compared to the case without the QE if G  G for some G < GFB:
According to the last result, although with the QE, banks receive free funding from
the CB and lend it at a positive interest rate, surprisingly they lose from the policy,
which thus does not subsidize them. That is because to banks, besides this positive
e¤ect on the scale, the QE induces a negative, general equilibrium e¤ect on the prot
margin by enlarging the lending capacities of all banks. As a result, banks obtain a
reduced prot from lending their notes. As @F=@G < 0; if bankswealth is above a
threshold (i.e. G); then the scale of the optimal QE is small enough. As a result, the
positive e¤ect from the enlargement of lending scale is small and dominated by the
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negative e¤ect from the reduction of prot margin. However, even in this case of banks
all losing from the free funding of the CB, given rs > 0, still individual banks strictly
prefer taking it rather than abstaining from it thus the QE can be conducted on a
voluntary base. The reason is that a single bank takes the prot margin of lending as
given and neglects the e¤ect on it of enlarging its own capacity.
In the circumstance where G > GFB and banks over-lend, we have seen that the QE
does not help. What the CB can do is discussed in the next section.
6 Interest Rate Policy and Capital Adequacy Reg-
ulation to Curb Bank Lending
If G > GFB; then banks over-lend, making the actual interest rate too low and entrepre-
neurs hire too many workers relative to the rst-best allocation. In this circumstance,
it is usually expected that the CB can help by setting a high policy interest rate. This
idea is explored in this section, where we show that interest-rate policy produces real
e¤ects and is able to attain the rst-best allocation if and only if there is a nominal
rigidity. In its absence, we show, capital adequacy regulation is always a remedy.
To explain the meaning of nominal rigidity in this paper, we dene nominal wage
as the total face value of banksnotes that workers receive as the wage payment. In
the absence of any intervention from the CB, the nominal wage is w because banks do
not default (due to the borrowing constraint 14). The nominal rigidity in this paper
is dened as the friction that keeps the nominal wage of workers staying at w and
unchanged with the CBs policy.
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6.1 Interest-Rate Policy Works if and only if the Nominal
Rigidity is Present
In the two-date economy of this paper, the CB sets the policy rate rp by o¤ering to
workers a savings account which takes in the deposit of banksnotes at t = 0 and pays
out with shells at t = 1: Specically, if the CB receives a deposit of some banksnotes
of overall face value F kg corn at t = 0, it issues to the depositor F (1 + rp) kg shells at
t = 1. Moreover, by taking in the notes, the CB becomes a creditor to the issuer banks
and charges these banks an interest rate of 1 + rp + " for some " > 0: Thus it obliges
these banks altogether to pay back F (1 + rp + ") at t = 1; either with corn or with
shells, counting 1kg corn equivalent to 1kg shells. There is one equilibrium in which
this policy is meaningful.24 In this equilibrium, if in total notes of face value F have
been deposited with the CB at t = 0 and consequently F (1 + rp) kg shells are created
at t = 1, then these shells are priced at par (i.e. 1kg shells worth 1kg corn) at t = 1.
On the one hand, they can never be priced above the par. On the other hand, shells are
not priced below the par either. Otherwise the banks indebted to the CB would want to
use only shells to settle all their debts. Thus, their aggregate demand for shells would
be F (1 + rp + ") kg, but only F (1 + rp) kg shells are created, insu¢ cient to meet the
demand. The deposit of bank notes with the CB and the creation of shells, however,
will not actually happen in equilibrium. Banks will pay their note holders the same
interest rate of rp (or even a little more) to stop them from depositing the notes with
the CB and avoid the payment of the even higher interest rate of rp + ". As a result of
the policy rate set at rp; therefore, a banks note of face value 1 issued at t = 0 is worth
1 + rp at t = 1; and banks that issue notes of aggregate face value D at t = 0 are in a
liability of D(1 + rp) at t = 1:
24As shells are at money, there is an equilibrium in which no one believes that shells have real value
at t = 1 and thus no one deposits any bank notes with the CB at t = 0; which makes the policy rate
meaningless.
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Having explained how the interest-rate policy is conducted in this economy, we state
its e¤ects in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose G > GFB: (i) If workersnominal wage adjusts with the policy
rate, the interest-rate policy produces no real e¤ects, but deates the nominal wage to
w=(1 + rp).
(ii) If workersnominal wage stays at w invariant to the CBs policy rate, the equilib-
rium interest rate of bank lending, bR; increases with the policy rate rp. At a unique value
of rp; bR = RFB and the rst-best allocation is attained. With the optimal interest-rate
policy, banks obtain zero prot if G  Gs where Gs  1 [(qA+(1 q)A) A](Ae=w)

1 
and satises GFB < Gs < 1G
:
Intuitively, in both regime of exible nominal wage and that of sticky nominal wage
a higher policy rate, by increasing the cost of deposit, induces the bank to set a higher
lending rate in the hope of shifting the increased cost of deposit to entrepreneurs: r
increases with rp in both regimes, as shown in the proof. As a result, in both regimes,
a higher policy rate reduces the quantity of bank credit that entrepreneurs borrow. In
the regime of exible wage, this reduction produces no e¤ect on the number of workers
they employ because it is exactly o¤set by the decrease in the nominal wage that worker
accept. In the regime of sticky wage, by contrast, the nominal wage stays the same and
this reduction in bank credit forces entrepreneurs to hire less workers. With a proper
policy rate, the number of workers they hire is brought down to the rst-best level, that
is, the rst-best allocation is attained. The decrease in entrepreneursdemand for bank
credit subjects banks to stronger competition. As a result, their prot margin of lending
is nullied if their lending capacity is not too small, that is, if their wealth is not too
low i.e. no less than Gs.
The interest-rate policy, therefore, works to improve e¢ ciency over the market equi-
librium if and only if the nominal rigidity is present. However, regulation that sets a
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lower bound on bankscapital adequacy ratio always works to curb the over-lending by
banks (if the CB has the authority for such regulation), as is shown below.
6.2 Capital-Adequacy Regulation Always Works
The aggregate face value of money that is needed for entrepreneurs to hire the rst-
best number of workers is wLFB := DFB: Suppose the CB imposes the constraint that
banks cannot issue more than DFB=G times of their wealth, G. Then, this constraint
is binding in the competitive equilibrium if G > GFB because in its absence, banks
issue more than DFB (as bR < RFB), thus the constraint violated, by Proposition 3.
The constraint, therefore, is binding, so banks issue DFB and the rst-best allocation
is attained. One way to implement this constraint is to impose at t = 0 a lower bound
on bankscapital adequacy ratio, which is dened as the equity to asset ratio in market
value, that is, (G+Y  D)=(G+Y ); where Y is the value of banksloans at t = 0, that
is, Y = q  Y + (1  q) Y : Dene
cFB :=
AeG+ (1  q)A(1  )DFB
AeG+ [qA+ (1  q)A]DFB
;
which is the capital adequacy ratio if banks lend the rst-best quantity of money (as is
shown in the proof of the following proposition).
Proposition 7 Suppose G > GFB: If the CB imposes regulation that restricts banks
capital adequacy ratio from being smaller than cFB; then banks issue the rst-best quan-
tity of money and the rst-best allocation is attained.
The intuition for why the regulation works is simple: the money that banks create
is their liability. Therefore, the scale of its issuance is subject to the capital adequacy
regulation. If the regulation is tight, then banks are restricted from over-lending.
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7 Conclusion
Banks are special because their liability, especially that in the form of demand deposit,
is widely accepted as a means of payment. Often real sectors need to borrow banks
liability (so called money or credit) to obtain resources that they want. This interaction
between the real sectors and the banking sector on competitive markets, as well as the
central banks remedy to market ine¢ ciency, is the focus of this paper. It underlines
the importance of banksaggregate wealth. Depending on the size of this wealth, there
are two types of ine¢ ciency.
If bankswealth is below a threshold, then they issue too little money, with symptoms
that the interest rate of bank credit is too high and that the sectors that depend on
it obtain inadequate resources. In this circumstance, the central bank can improve
e¢ ciency by lending to all banks its at money at zero interest rate. This policy, which
bears avour of the QE, works because of a di¤erence in nature between bank created
money and at money. The latter is not redeemable, whereas the former bears real
obligations of redemption. Furthermore, the policy induces deation under the positive
productivity shock. Lastly, while the policy gives to banks free funding which they lend
out at a positive interest rate, it does not subsidize them unless their wealth is very low.
If bankswealth is above the threshold, on the other hand, banks lend out too much
money, with symptoms that the interest rate of bank credit is too low and that the
resources are skewed to the sectors that highly depend on it. To curb over-lending by
banks, the central bank may set a high policy rate, which, however, works if and only if
the nominal wage cannot freely adjust with the policy. By contrast, the regulation that
sets a tight capital-adequacy ratio always works because the money that banks create
is their liability, its quantity thus subject to the regulation.
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Appendix: The Proofs
Of Lemma 1:
In equilibrium, only one promised wage, denoted by F , prevails on the market, as
will be shown. Competitive equilibrium is thus dened as a prole of (F;L); such that:
(a) Given that F prevails on the market, the optimal demand for labor of each
entrepreneur is L;
(b) Given that each entrepreneur demands L workers, F clears the labor market.
The two conditions are elaborated as follows.
For (a): Given F; a representative entrepreneurs decision problem on labor demand
is:
max
L
q(AL   FL) + (1  q)max(AL   FL; 0);
where the "max" term appears because the entrepreneur might default in the bad state.
That is indeed the case at the optimum. Otherwise, the entrepreneurs problem is
max
L
q(AL   FL) + (1  q)(AL   FL):
The solution is L = (Ae
F
)
1
1  : Then in the bad state his output is A((Ae
F
)

1  ; which
is smaller than F  (Ae
F
)
1
1  ; the wage obligation, because A < Ae as assumed in (1).
Hence, he defaults in the bad state, contradictory to what was supposed.
Defaulting in the bad state, entrepreneurs choose L to maximize the prot in the
good state, AL   FL: Therefore, given F , the labor demand is:
L = (
A
F
)
1
1  : (20)
For (b): As there are a lot more workers than entrepreneurs can hire, the labor mar-
ket is cleared by an expected wage income of w; the output of workers in autarky. In the
good state, the workers hired get the promised wage, F: In the bad state, entrepreneurs
default and all the output goes to the workers, of which each obtains AL

L
= AL 1: The
labor market clears if
qF + (1  q)AL 1 = w: (21)
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Equations (20) and (21) together pins down LSB as given in the lemma.
Now, show that only one F prevails on the market. If an entrepreneur posts F; then
by (20) he hires L = (A
F
)
1
1  workers, whose wage income is F in the good state and
AL 1 = A
A
F in the bad state. Both increase with F . Therefore, workers go only
to entrepreneurs who post the highest F; and in competitive equilibrium, only one F
prevails.
Q.E.D.
Of Lemma 2:
Suppose, otherwise, an entrepreneur does not default in the bad state. Then, his
problem is:
max
E
q(AL   E(1 + r)) + (1  q)(AL   E(1 + r)) s.t. (3):
From the constraint, E = wL=. Substitute it into the objective and let   w(1+r)=.
Then, the problem becomes
max
L
AeL
   L:
The solution is L = (Ae=)
1
1  : At this scale, the entrepreneur will default in the bad
state: AL < E(1 + r)jE=wL=;w(1+r)= , AL < L , AL 1 < j
L=(Ae=)
1
1  ,
A < Ae; which is assumed in (1) hence a contraction to what was supposed.
Q.E.D.
Of Lemma 3:
As the entrepreneurs all default in the bad state and each hands over his whole
output, y; to the bank, the value of the banks loans in the bad state, Y ; equals y times
the number of entrepreneurs that the bank nances, D=E: With y = AL; and E and
L given by (4) and (5),
y
E
=
A(1 + r)
A
: (22)
Then, Y = y D=E = D  y=E = A(1 + r)=A D; that is (8).
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Q.E.D.
Of Lemma 4:
(D; r) = EeY max(G+eY D; 0) G = EeY max(eY D; G) = EeY heY +max( D; G  eY )i =
EeY
heY  min(D;G+ eY )i = EeY heY  D min(1; G+eYD )i = DEeY h eYD  min(1; G+eYD )i ;
which, with  = min(1; G+eY
D
); equalsDEeY
h eY
D
  
i
= D
h
q Y
D
+ (1  q)Y
D
  
i
; which,
as Y = D(1+r) and Y = D A
A
(1+r); equals Dq(1 + r) + (1  q) A
A
(1 + r)   =
D   1+r
RSB
   :
Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 2:
(i): It has been shown in the main text.
(ii): Prove the "if" part by reduction to absurdity. Suppose that in one equilibrium,
no banks default, namely, (9) is honored for all banks. Then, for all banks  = 1 and
1 + r = bRjresult (i) = RSB: By (9), each bank issues,
D  G=(1  A
A
RSB) =
G[qA+ (1  q)A]
q(A  A) :
With  = 1 and 1 + r = RSB; by (4) the demand by entrepreneurs is E = (qA + (1 
q)A)
1
1 w
 
1  : If G < G; then D < E; that is, the supply is below the demand thus
not in equilibrium.
To prove the "only if" part, it su¢ ces to show if G  G, no banks default in the
symmetric equilibrium, which is constructed as follows. Banks all choose r = RSB 1 and
D to satisfy entrepreneursdemand for notes E = (qA+ (1  q)A) 11 w  1  . With this
value of (D; r); it is straightforward to check that if G  G; the no-default condition,
(9), is honored and hence no banks default in the bad state. Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 3:
Note that as there is no default,  = 1 and 1+ r = R: In any equilibrium, the actual
interest rate that all banks o¤er equals the market clearing rate, that is, R = bR: As
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1 + r = bR and  = 1; by (4), the demand by entrepreneurs is E = [A=( bRw)] 11  :=
E( bR); which decreases with bR: Due to the borrowing constraint, (14), and with R = bR,
the quantity of notes supply satises
D  G(1  A
A
bR) 1 := D  bR;G :
Moreover, if bR > RSB, the prot margin of lending is positive, banks want to lend as
much as they can, and therefore the constraint is binding. It follows that the supply
function is
D
 bR;G =
8>>><>>>:
0 if bR < RSB
[0; D
 bR;G] if bR = RSB
D
 bR;G if bR > RSB
9>>>=>>>; :
The equilibrium value of bR is determined by E( bR) = D  bR;G :
(i) if G  1

G; then D
 bR;G > E( bR) for bR > RSB and D  bR;G < E( bR) forbR < RSB: Therefore, in equilibrium bR = RSB: Hence L = LSB  the second best
allocation is attained and the prot margin of lending is 0, the same as is in the case
of the least fettered issuance.
IfG < 1

G; D
 bR;G < E( bR) for bR  RSB. Therefore, in equilibrium bR > RSB and
is determined by E( bR) = D  bR;G ; or equivalently, equation (16), replicated below:
G = G( bR)  1

(
A
w
)
1
1   1 
A
A
bRbR 11  : (23)
It is straightforward to show for this function G() that G0 < 0; G(RSB) = 1

G and
G(A=A) = 0:
Furthermore, as all the banks issue D; there is no indeterminancy in the scale of
issuance by individual banks and the equilibrium uniquely exists.
(ii): Let bR(G) be the inverse function of G( bR): Then, in the equilibrium bR = bR(G)
if G < 1

G: As G( bR) is decreasing, so is bR(G). Moreover, bR( 1

G) = RSB and bR(0) =
A=A because G(RSB) = 1

G and G(A=A) = 0: With R = bR, the number of workers
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hired in equilibrium, by (5), is L = (A=w bR) 11  ; which decreases with bR: Thus, L
increases with G. Moreover, L = LSB at bR = RSB which holds if G = 1

G. At the
other end, if G = 0; then bR = A=A. As L is in proportion to (1= bR) 11  ; we have
L = LSB  (RSB= bR) 11  = LSB  [ RSB
A=A
]
1
1  = LSB  [ A
qA+(1 q)A ]
1
1  :
Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 4:
(i) To characterize the equilibrium, observe that if the QEs scale S is small enough
the threshold for which will be found later then bR > RSB still holds and rs > 0:
That is, lending bears a positive prot margin. It has two implications: (1) both notes
and shells are lent out; and (2) they are lent in the maximum quantity, that is, banks
borrowing constraint (15) is binding and all the S units of shells are in circulation.
From implication (1) it follows that the actual interest rates of borrowing the two
types of money are equalized, and equal to bR, the market rate. Following the discussion
in subsection 3.1, the actual interest rate of borrowing shells is (1 + rs)=p0, while the
actual interest rate of borrowing banksnotes is 1 + r (since  = 1 as banks do not
default). Therefore,
1 + rs
p0
= 1 + r = bR: (24)
From implication (2), the quantity of notes issued is D = G=(1   A
A
bR). Given
they are not discounted (i.e.  = 1) and the ex ante value of shells per unit is p0; the
aggregate value of means of payment supplied is p0S+D; which, when the market clears,
equals the wage payment that entrepreneurs demand to hire workers:
wL = p0S +
G
1  A bR=(A) : (25)
By (5), the number of workers they hire is
L = (
A
w
)
1
1  bR  11  : (26)
These four equations (note 24 has two) together with equation (18) (which settles
p0); as shown below, determine a unique prole of (p0; rs; r; bR;L) in equilibrium thus,
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the equilibrium in which shells circulate exists uniquely. Passing on to show that, we rst
derive equations (19). By ( 24), 1+ rs = bRp0: Substituting it into (18) and rearranging,
we have:
p0 =
q
1  (1  q)A=(A)  bR: (27)
Substitute it and (26) into (25)), rearrange, let   A=(A)  bR, and we come to (19):
S = (
A
w
)
1
1 
1  (1  q)
q

1

1
1 
  G
1  

 F (): (28)
It is straightforward to verify that (a) F 0() < 0; (b) equation F () = 0 is equivalent to
(16). Thus, at S = 0, bR = bR(G); where bR(G) is the interest rate determined by (16)
in Proposition 3, namely, the actual interest rate without the QE; and (c) at bR = RSB;
F ( A
A
RSB) = S(G). It follows that for any S < S(G); equation (28) determines a uniquebR 2 (RSB; bR(G)]; hence S(G) is the threshold that was to be found at the beginning of
the proof. After bR is found, it uniquely determines r, L, and p0 respectively through
equations (24), (26), and (27). It also uniquely determines rs by putting equations (24)
and (27) together, which leads to:
rs =
[qA+ (1  q)A] bR  A
A  (1  q)A bR : (29)
Therefore, any S 2 [0; S(G)) pins down a unique equilibrium prole of (p0; rs; r; bR;L):
By (29), rs > 0, bR > RSB , S < S(G): Moreover, A(1+rs)=(A) < 1, 1+rs <
A=Aj(29) , q bR=[1   (1   q)A=(A)  bR] < A=A , bR < A=Aj bR< bR(G) ( bR(G) <
A=A; which is a¢ rmed by Proposition 3(ii).
(ii): As F 0() < 0; we have ; and thus bR; decrease with S: By property (c) of
function F () above, bR = RSB at S = S(G): By (29), rs increases with bR and rs = 0 atbR = RSB: Therefore, rs decreases with S and equals 0 at S = S(G).
Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 5:
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Result (i) is proved in the main text. As for (ii): As G < GFB; bR(G) > RFB > RSB.
Note that bR = bR(G) at S = 0 and bR = RSB at S = S(G): Therefore, there is a unique
S between 0 and S(G) at which bR = RFB and this S equals F ( A
A
 RFB) by (19). As
for the prot of banks, in the unique equilibrium, each bank serves N entrepreneurs
and the prot obtained from one of them, b; is the di¤erence of the social value of his
project minus his prot from it; that is, b = AeL   wL  V . With L and V given by
(5) and (6) and R = bR;
b = (A
w
)

1  (qA+ (1  q)A)  bR  11  ( bR RSB):
Note that b increases with bR for bR 2 [RSB; 1

RSB]: Dene G  G( 1

RSB): Then, if
G  G; we have bR  bR(G)  bR(G) = 1

RSB for any S  0. Therefore, the QE of any
S > 0 in particular the optimal one  lowers b and hence reduces banksprot by
decreasing bR.
Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 6:
(i) The equilibrium is found in a way parallel to that of Proposition 3: rst nd the
demand for notes given bR, then the supply and nally the equilibrium value of bR: GivenbR; entrepreneurs hire L = (A
w
)
1
1  bR  11  workers by (5). With exible nominal wage,
workers accept a nominal wage of w=(1 + rp). Therefore, the demand for notes is
E
 bR = w(A
w
)
1
1 
bR  11 
1 + rp
:
Now consider the supply side. By borrowing face value E; an entrepreneur hires
E(1 + rp)=w workers, which means that  = 1 + rp in equation (3). Hence if a bank
charges interest r; the actual rate of its loans is R = (1 + r)=(1 + rp): At the optimum,
all banks o¤er R = bR, the market clearing rate. It follows that
1 + r = bR(1 + rp):
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That is, banks mark up the interest rate on loans to pass the cost of deposit due to
the interest rate policy on to entrepreneurs. If a bank issues notes of aggregate face
value D; then at t = 1; with the interest-rate policy, its liability to the note holders
is D(1 + rp): The equity value in the bad state is thus G + Y   D(1 + rp); which, by
the borrowing constraint, cannot be smaller than (1   )G: With Y = A(1+r)
A
D; this
constraint is equivalent to:
D(1 + rp)  G+ A(1 + r)
A
D; (30)
which, with 1 + r = bR(1 + rp), is equivalent to
D  G
1 + rp
(1  A
A
bR) 1 := D  bR;G :
Proposition 1, if bR = RSB; the prot margin of lending is zero and banks are indi¤erent
in any D; while if bR > RSB; the prot margin is positive and banks want to lend as
much as they can, that is, the above borrowing constraint is binding. Hence, the supply
of notes is
D
 bR;G =
8>>><>>>:
0 if bR < RSB
[0; D
 bR;G] if bR = RSB
D
 bR;G if bR > RSB
9>>>=>>>; :
Observe that in equation E
 bR = D  bR;G ; the factor 1+rp is canceled out, and
the equation is equivalent to E
 bR = D  bR;G ; where E () and D () are the demand
and maximum supply functions of notes in Proposition 3, namely, in the absence of the
policy. It follows that E
 bR = D  bR;G if and only if E  bR = D  bR;G ; where
D () is the supply functions of notes in Proposition 3. That is, the equilibrium bR in
the presence of the interest rate policy is the same as that in its absence. Therefore, the
interest-rate policy produces no real e¤ects.
(ii) In the circumstance where the nominal wage of workers stays at w invariant to
the policy rate rp; if an entrepreneur borrows notes of face value E; he still hires E=w
(rather than E(1 + rp)=w) workers. This implies (1) that the aggregate demand for
43
notes is wL (rather than wL=(1 + rp)); which is equalized to the aggregate supply D
in equilibrium; and (2) that the discount factor in (3) is  = 1; whereby the actual
interest rate to entrepreneurs is R = 1 + r (rather than R = (1 + r)=(1 + rp)): GivenbR; L = (A
w
)
1
1  bR  11  by (5). It follows from implication (1) that D = w(A
w
)
1
1  bR  11  :
At the optimum all banks choose R = bR; which together with implication (2) means
1 + r = bR: Substitute these into (30) and banksborrowing constraint becomes:
w(
A
w bR) 11  [(1 + rp)  AA bR)  G: (31)
This borrowing constraint is binding if the prot margin of lending is positive, as
before. Given that the workers real wage is now w(1 + rp), the prot to a bank
from lending to one entrepreneur becomes AeL   w(1 + rp)L   V . With L and V
as functions of R = bR given by (5) and (6), the prot margin with sticky wage is
[A=(w bR)] 11  [ bR=RSB   (1 + rp)]:This prot margin never goes below 0. Therefore,
1 + rp  bR=RSB; (32)
which implies that bR  RSB:
The equilibrium actual interest rate bR is pinned down by conditions (31), (32), and
that one of them must be binding: if (32) is not binding that is, if the prot margin
of issuance is positive then banks keep issuing notes until the no-default constraint,
(31), is binding. Note that (31) is equivalent to
1 + rp  ( bR); (33)
where
(R)  Gw

1 
(A)
1
1 
R
1
1  +
A
A
R; (34)
and obviously 0() > 0; and the inverse function,  1() exists. Then in equilibrium,
inequalities (33) and (32) hold, and one of them must be binding. Therefore,
1 + rp = min
 bR=RSB;( bR) := H( bR): (35)
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We only need to consider function H () over bR  RSB:
Claim P6: Over bR  RSB; if G  1

G; H( bR) = bR=RSB; and if G < 1

G; then
H( bR) =
8<: ( bR) if bR  RbR=RSB if bR  R
9=;
where
R =
A
w

q(A  A)
G
 1 

: (36)
Proof : Let (R)  (R) R=RSB for R  0: Then (R) = 0 has two roots: 0 and
R: Then (a) R  RSB if and only if G  1

G. (b)  < 0 for R 2 (0; R) and  > 0
for R > R; because 0(0) < 0: These two results lead to the claim. q.e.d.
With help of the claim, we solve bR as a function of rp from (35) as follows. If
G  1

G; bR = RSB(1 + rp): If G < 1G; then
bR =
8<:  1(1 + rp) if rp  rpRSB(1 + rp) if rp  rp
9=; ;
where rp  R=RSB   1, which, as (R) = 0; also equals (R)   1; hence rp  0 ,
R  RSB , G  1

G:
In both cases, bR increases with the policy rate rp to innity. And at rp = 0; namely
in the absence of the CBs intervention, bR < RFB in this circumstance of banks over-
lending. Therefore, there exists a unique policy rate at which bR = RFB and the rst-best
allocation is attained.
Banks obtain zero prot if the non-negative prot constraint, (32), is binding, namely
H( bR) = bR=RSB, which, by claim P6, is the case if bR  R: With the optimal policy
rate, bR = RFB; and hence banks obtain zero prot if RFB  R; which is equivalent
to G  Gs := 1 [(qA + (1   q)A)   A](Ae=w)

1  : It is straightforward to check that
GFB < Gs <
1

G: Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 7:
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According to the discussion of subsection 3.2, Y = D(1 + r) and Y = A=(A) 
D(1 + r): Therefore, Y = [q + (1   q)A=(A)] D(1 + r): Moreover, at the optimum,
banks all o¤er 1 + r = bR: It follows that if banks issue D; the capital adequacy ratio is
c =
G+ f[q + (1  q)A=(A)] bR  1gD
G+ [q + (1  q)A=(A)] bRD :
If banks issuance is at the rst-quantity and the rst-best allocation is attained, then
D = DFB and R = RFB in the above formula and the capital adequacy ratio equals
cFB :=
AeG+ (1  q)A(1  )DFB
AeG+ [qA+ (1  q)A]DFB
:
The regulation restricts c  cFB: To prove the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that this
restriction is equivalent to D  DFB; the constraint which we saw in the main text will
lead to the rst best allocation. This equivalence follows from two observations. One, c =
cFB if D = DFB. The other, c decreases with D because c = 1  D
G+[q+(1 q)A=(A)] bRD :=
c(D; bR) and moreover, @c
@D
< 0 and @c
@ bR > 0 while bR decreases with D.
Q.E.D.
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